One contribution of 15 to a theme issue 'Second quantum revolution: foundational questions'.
Introduction
Since 1982 significant violations of Bell's [1, 2] , ClauserHorne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) [3] , Clauser-Horne [4] . 
Local explanation of correlations in spin polarization correlation experiments
First of all let us recall that, in general, QM does not give predictions for single outcomes of quantum measurements but only provides probabilistic predictions to be compared with the statistical spread of outcomes observed in repeated measurements, on identically prepared physical systems, in well-defined experimental contexts [19, 33] .
Since sharp directions do not exist, QM does not predict, contrary to a general belief, strict correlations or anticorrelations in SPCE [29, [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] . Since local causality is consistent with macroscopic phenomena, we want to explain these observed imperfect correlations in a locally causal way.
The correlations among distant events depend on how the pairing of them is done. In SPCE, Alice and Bob may use synchronized time windows and the observed events are successive clicks or the absence of a click on detectors. These events are coded by 0 and ±1 and can be considered to be the values of some random variables (A, B) describing these random experiments. In order to check the predictions of QM and/or CHSH inequalities, one carefully post-selects samples keeping only events in which both Alice and Bob registered a click in their synchronized time windows.
A model we propose describes how raw data before the post-selection are created. It is based on the assumption that signals produced by a source keep a partial memory of the common past when they arrive at distant laboratories. Then remote measuring instruments operate in a locally causal way and outcomes may be correlated more strongly than it was permitted by SHV and LRHV models.
We use a notation consistent with Barret & Gisin [21] . As we explain later, this notation may be sometimes confusing. We assume the following:
1. A source is sending two correlated signals (correlated pairs of photons) towards distant measuring settings. These correlated signals are described at the moment of measurement by some, hidden to experimentalists, correlated supplementary parameters (λ 1 , λ 2 ) ∈ Λ 1 × Λ 2 and P(λ 1 , λ 2 ). 2. We assume freedom of choice: Alice and Bob may choose their experimental settings (x, y) randomly or in any systematic way. We do not believe that a setting chosen by Alice may influence a distant setting chosen by Bob. If choice of the setting is made by RNGs, then the probability of choosing a particular setting is given by P(x, y). 3. The measuring instruments used in the setting (x, y), as perceived by the incoming signals at the moment of measurement, are described by supplementary parameters λ x ∈ Λ x , λ y ∈ Λ y and probability distributions P x (λ x ) and P y (λ y ). 4. The outcomes a = 0, ±1 and b = 0, ±1 are created in a deterministic way as a function of local parameters describing measuring instruments and a given pair: P(a|x, λ 1 , λ x ) = 0 or 1 and P(b|y, λ 2, λ y ) = 0 or 1. Outcomes 0 correspond to the absence of a click. If we want to test only CHSH inequalities or check quantum predictions for correlations, we limit ourselves to correlated time windows in which both clicks were registered. In this case possible outcomes are a = ±1 and b = ±1 [39, 40] .
Using the points 1-4, we obtain a probability of obtaining outcomes (a, b) when the setting (x, y) is used P(a, b|x, y):
where Note that P(λ|x, y) is not a conditional probability in the usual sense deduced from some joint probability of all possible (x, y, λ) which does not need to exist. P(λ|x, y) denotes only a probability distribution of supplementary parameters used in a particular setting (x, y).
Nevertheless, if P(λ, x, y) = P(λ|x, y)P(x, y) then using Bayes theorem P(x, y|λ) = P(x, y) [21, 31] . This inequality is treated as a proof that if λ depends on (x, y) then experimenters' freedom of choice is compromised. Of course it is not true because a conditional probability P(A|B) does not mean, in general, that B is a cause of A.
We discuss this subtle point in detail in §6.
If we describe only the data registered by Alice without taking into consideration any data registered by Bob, we obtain P(a|x):
A similar formula can be written for P(b|y). Expectation functions in our model can be written as
where
and B y (λ 2 ,λ y ) are equal 0, ±1. Since in our contextual locally causal model hidden variables depend explicitly on the choice of settings, Bell-type inequalities cannot be proved. The outcomes are neither predetermined nor obtained in an irreducibly random way.
By no means have we claimed that SPCE should be described using (2.1)-(2.3) instead of QM. We only wanted to show that intuitive explanation of long-range correlations observed in SPCE is possible. Using completely different models De Raedt, Michielsen and co-workers [41] [42] [43] succeeded to simulate several quantum experiments including SPCE without questioning the locality of Nature.
Local realistic hidden variable, stochastic hidden variable and Bell 1970 models
We may prove Bell-type inequalities if we assume that for all the settings
. Then the formula (2.1) is replaced by a formula used in the SHV model:
We may also prove Bell-type inequalities using the formula (2.3) with
and B y (λ 2 , λ y ) = B y (λ 2 ) taking values 0 and ±1 (or only ±1):
The above formula is a discrete version of the original formula proposed by Bell in 1964 [1] :
LRHV models (3.2) and (3.3) are using the same unique parameter space and the same joint probability distribution to describe different incompatible random experiments (x, y), which is in conflict with Kolmogorov theory of probability and with experimental protocols used in SPCE. Let us reproduce his proof using our model. From (2.3) after a summation over (λ x , λ y ) we obtain
Now |Ā x (λ 1 )| ≤ 1, |B y (λ 2 )| ≤ 1 and it is easy to prove that expectation values evaluated using (3.4) obey CHSH inequalities, namely
and
, we obtain immediately CHSH inequalities:
A subtle point is that in SPCE one estimates expectation values using an experimental protocol consistent with (2.3) not with (3.4). To estimate correlations using (3.4) one should repeat measurements (with the same setting) on the same correlated pair of photons, then average the results for each pair and finally average the results obtained for all the pairs. Such a protocol is impossible to implement because you cannot repeat measurements on the same pair of photons which were already absorbed by the detectors. CHSH inequalities can be proved because the summation in (3.4) over (λ x , λ y ) destroys correlations created by a source. More detailed discussion of experimental protocols may be found in the next section and in [40] .
Kolmogorov models and experimental protocols
Outcomes of any random experiment are described by a specific probability space Ω, σ -algebra F of all its sub-ensembles and a probabilistic measure μ. An ensemble E ∈ F is called an event.
A probability of observing the event E is given by 0 ≤ μ(E) ≤ 1. In statistics instead of Ω we use a sample space S which contains only possible outcomes of a studied random experiment. An extensive discussion of subtle notions of randomness and probability with applications to QM may be found in [44] . Kolmogorov probability theory, similarly to quantum theory, is contextual, which means that different experiments are described by different probabilistic models using different spaces Ω. Please note that we use contextual in a specific probabilistic sense. For us, probabilities are objective properties of random experiments performed in well-defined experimental contexts; thus QM providing a probabilistic model for such experiments is a contextual theory.
Since in QM an act of observation is not a passive reading of pre-existing properties of physical systems, models of a measurement process must introduce correctly the parameters describing measuring instruments.
There are a few situations when we can use the same probability space and a joint probability distribution in order to describe different random experiments:
1. We have a set O = (A 1 , . . . A n ) of compatible observables (properties) which may be observed or measured in any order on each member of some statistical population (group of people, identically prepared physical systems). In this case, from a joint probability distribution of a multivariate random variable, we may deduce marginal probability distributions describing all random experiments in which only some subsets of the set O are measured. 2. We have n random experiments described by n independent random variables (flipping of n fair coins, rolling of n fair dice); then, no matter how pairing of the experimental outcomes is done, outcomes are uncorrelated. A joint probability distribution is a product of probability distributions describing these n independent random experiments.
Hidden variable models are not Kolmogorov models. In Kolmogorov models, a sample space contains outcomes of real experiments. In hidden variable models, parameters λ are not outcomes of any feasible random experiment. These parameters are used to define invisible experimental protocols according to which observed outcomes of a random experiment might be obtained.
In Kolmogorov models a summation or integration over some variables leads to marginal probability distributions describing realizable random experiments. In hidden variable models a summation or integration over some hidden variables defines, in general, new protocols describing different random experiments which cannot be performed. This is why, as we demonstrated in the previous section, the probabilistic hidden variable models (2.3) and (3.4) are not equivalent.
Nevertheless LRHV models are isomorphic to Kolmogorov models describing situation 1 and SHV models to the models describing situation 2. In contrast to the contextual probabilistic models (2.1)-(2.3), both of them assume hidden experimental protocols which cannot be implemented and which are inconsistent with the experimental protocols used in SPCE [40] .
If hidden variables depend on the settings then Bell-type inequalities may not be proved [29, [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] . Already in 1862, George Boole showed that whatever process generates a dataset S of triples of variables (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ), where S i = ±1, then the averages of products of pairs S i S j in a dataset S have to satisfy equalities very similar to Bell inequalities [52, 55, 56] . In 1962, Vorob'ev [68] gave a concrete example showing that it was not possible to construct a joint probability distribution for any triple of pairwise measurable dichotomous random variables.
Khrennikov [63, 64] constructed a generalized Kolmogorov probabilistic model describing the SPCE experiment, with random choices of incompatible settings, and explained why in this model CHSH inequalities could not be proved.
As Theo Nieuwenhuizen has said, various hidden variable models used to prove Bell-type inequalities suffer from a fatal theoretical contextuality loophole [66, 67] because they do not incorporate correctly supplementary parameters describing measuring instruments.
If Bell-type inequalities are violated by experimental data, it only means that the models used to prove them are inappropriate for the experiments in which they are tested. This is why correlations violating Bell-type inequalities may also be found in different domains of science [61, 62] .
Entanglement and instantaneous influences
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) [15] demonstrated that if two quantum particles interacted in the past and are separated then the outcomes of various measurements performed on them may be strongly correlated. According to QM, if two physical systems are separated and free, the outcomes of measurements performed on them should not be correlated. Therefore, separated particles seem to be entangled by some incomprehensible influences.
EPR concluded that this apparent paradox may be resolved if a statistical interpretation of the wave function is adopted. According to this interpretation the description of individual physical systems provided by QM is not complete. If outcomes of measurements, for example of linear momenta, performed on EPR particles are predetermined, they are strongly correlated due to the conservation of total linear momentum of a pair. This idea, incorporated in LRHV models, failed to explain the correlations observed in SPCE. However, as we discuss in §8, spin projections are only defined and determined after the interaction with the measuring instrument, in contrast to the values of linear momenta considered by EPR.
As we explained in §2, QM does not predict perfect correlation or anticorrelation of spin projections [29, [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] . Therefore, if Bob and Alice decide before the experiment to choose the same experimental setting when Alice obtains a click on one of her detectors, in a particular time window, she does not know with certainty whether Bob registers a click on his detector in the same time window. Therefore, Alice's outcomes do not give any knowledge concerning Bob's outcomes. As we explain in §7, for us knowledge is not a degree of the observer's belief quantified by some subjective probability. According to QM, an outcome of a spin projection is only known when it is registered and as Peres [69] 
said: unperformed experiments have no results.
Another misconception is related to the description of how entanglement is created. For example, in his discussion of the Delft group experiment, Alain Aspect [70] writes 'Mixing two photons on a beam splitter and detecting them in coincidence entangles the electron spins on the remote NV centers'. This suggests an instantaneous influence of a single observed event on two remote physical systems. In our opinion, the reason for correlations between distant experiments may be a partial memory of the source carried by signals, like in (2.1), or particular preparations of distant NV (nitrogen vacancy) centres. The observation of a particular coincidence signal does not create these particular preparations but gives only the information that such preparations occurred in remote places [29] .
Therefore, to explain in an intuitive way long-range correlations observed in SPCE and predicted by QM, we do not need to evoke quantum non-locality understood as a mysterious law of Nature according to which two distant random experiments produce perfectly correlated outcomes.
It is also claimed that to save locality of Nature one has to assume a superdeterminism and deny the existence of free will. In the next section, we show that such claims are unfounded.
Bayes theorem, free will and measurement independence
According to models (2.1)-(2.3), experimentalists may use their free will to choose their experimental settings and explain imperfect correlations observed in SPCE in a locally causal way. We want to avoid here philosophical and/or theological discussion about whether free will may exist or not. Our everyday decisions are conditioned by many uncontrollable factors but in physics our freedom of experimenting or freedom of choice is the unavoidable axiom.
In SPCE, the question of existence of free will seems to be irrelevant because settings are selected using RNGs. It seems unnecessary and counter-productive to speculate whether RNGs and other measuring devices might be synchronized due to their shared past or not.
Therefore, instead of talking about free will or freedom of choice, one often prefers to talk about measurement independence defined as: 'measurement settings can be chosen independently on any underlying variables describing the system' [71] [72] [73] . This assumption is expressed in terms of conditional probabilities: P(x, y, λ) = P(x, y)P(λ), P(x, y|λ) = P(x, y) and
If one omits to include parameters describing measuring instruments, then it is reasonable to assume that the choice of remaining parameters and the choice of the settings are independent events in the usual probabilistic sense. This is why in SHV (3.1) and LRHV (3.2), (3.3) models probability distributions of hidden variables do not depend on the setting (x, y). As already Bell [1] noticed, if P(λ|x, y) = P(λ) then Bell-type inequalities cannot be proved. If P(λ|x, y) = P(λ) then using Bayes theorem one may prove that P(x, y|λ) = P(x, y), which is wrongly interpreted as: the experimentalists have no freedom of choosing their experimental settings.
As we mentioned already in §2, such interpretation is based on incorrect interpretation of conditional probabilities. We will give below a detailed explanation.
In the Kolmogorov probabilistic model, Bayes theorem is simply a definition of conditional probabilities [44] . Let us consider three events E 1 , E 2 and A (in mathematical statistics and in physics by 'events' we understand a subset of outcomes of some random experiment) such that E 1 ∩E 2 = Ø, E 1 ∩A = Ø and E 2 ∩A = Ø, where Ø denotes an empty set. Conditional probabilities P(A|E i ) and P(E i |A) are simply defined by the formula 
where S is a sample space, we may also write a total probability formula:
Conditional probabilities, in general, say nothing about causal relation between the events A and E i . Let us consider two random experiments:
1. In experiment 1, we have in a box red and white balls which are big or small.
A The meaning of these conditional probabilities is: if we repeat our experiment, '1 out of 3 drawn red balls is likely to be big' and '1 out of 4 drawn big balls is likely to be red'. There is no causal relation between E 1 and A. 2. Experiment 2 is a randomized drug trial in which a selected group of people with a moderately high blood pressure take a daily a dose of a candesartan (C) or a placebo (P). After one month the blood pressure is measured several times to check whether targeted lower levels were achieved: yes (Y) or not (N). Corresponding events are:
There is probably a causal relation between 'taking candesartan' and 'lowering blood pressure' which is quantified by a probability P(A|E 1 ). There is no causal interpretation attached to the conditional probability P(E 1 |A) which tells us only 'how likely an individual on a study whose blood pressure decreased was taking candesartan'.
The experiment 2 is a good example of a standard application of Bayes theorem and of Bayesian reasoning.
In the Kolmogorov approach, any probability assigned to a specific event must in principle be liable to verification. In hidden variable models, P(x, y, λ) are inaccessible to any verification. Nevertheless, we may still try to arrive to some conclusions using Bayes theorem and assuming that P(x, y, λ) = P(λ|x, y)P(x, y). Let us see it using our model (2.1):
To prove (6.5), we use the identity P(λ x , λ y ) = P x (λ x )P y (λ y )P(x, y). The meaning of (6.5) is the following: if an 'event' (λ x , λ y ) occurs then the settings (x, y) were used. It does not mean that (λ x , λ y ) have any causal influence on the choice of the settings. Therefore, all claims [21, 31] that Bayes theorem proves the opposite are simply incorrect.
People often do not distinguish between colloquial independence and stochastic independence of events. They forget that if E i ∩A = E i (events are dependent) then P(A|E i ) = 1 but it does not mean that there is any causal influence of the event E i on the event A.
Since the setting dependence of hidden variables does not constrain experimenters' freedom of choice, it should be called contextuality instead of being called violation of measurement independence.
Hall [72, 73] arrived recently, using a different reasoning, at a similar conclusion: 'a violation of measurement independence is not automatically inconsistent with apparent experimental freedom'.
Bayesian reasoning is a powerful tool in modern mathematical statistics, having many applications in various domains of science, including physics. This is why some physicists were tempted to interpret quantum probabilities as subjective judgements of human agents and claimed that such interpretation called quantum Bayesianism (Qbism) is the best interpretation of QM free of paradoxes. We disagree with this claim and we explain it in the next section.
Subjective probabilities, quantum Bayesianism and physical reality
According to QBism: quantum probabilities are probability assignments made by human agents [74] [75] [76] . For QBists, the entire purpose of QM and physics, in general, 'is to enable any single agent to organize her own degrees of belief about the contents of her own personal experience' [75] . This point of view has been criticized [77] [78] [79] .
In our opinion, the aim of physics is to discover laws of Nature governing the objectively existing external world. Physicists are not verifying their personal beliefs about their observations but searching for a mathematical abstract description allowing them to explain and to predict in a quantitative way physical phenomena observed and those to be discovered. These laws do not depend on the existence and on the presence of human agents.
Of course we perceive the surrounding world by our senses and we probe it using experimental devices constructed by us. If our senses and brains were different, we would probably grasp different aspects of this world if we were able to do it.
It is amazing that the laws of Nature we were able to discover and the theories we constructed allow us to produce new materials, cure diseases and explore the Solar System and beyond. Perhaps our success is due to the fact that our senses and brains are the product of evolution which has been governed by the laws of Nature which we were able only to discover in recent centuries.
These laws of Nature governed physical phenomena long before Homo sapiens started their quest for the explanation. Stars were created and vanished, tectonic plates were moving, planets were orbiting around the Sun, seasons and tides were changing periodically. We can continue with examples from biology: animal migration patterns were repeating, courtship rituals and mating were coded in genes, the evolution of species was driven by environmental changes, etc.
In quantum phenomena invisible signals and particles prepared by some sources interact with macroscopic devices and after a substantial magnification produce clicks on various detectors. Quantum theory (QT) provides an abstract mathematical model allowing us to make objective quantitative predictions about the energy levels of atoms and molecules, to make probabilistic predictions concerning the statistical scatter of outcomes registered by various macroscopic instruments, etc.
Quantum probabilistic models often contain free parameters which can be treated as Bayesian priors. The best estimates of the unknown values of these parameters are obtained using the maximum-likelihood model based on the Bayesian approach.
This does not allow the interpretation of wave functions (state vectors) as mathematical entities corresponding to subjective beliefs of human agents. Two high-energy protons from cosmic rays, when they collide far away from human agents, are as likely to produce several π mesons as if they collided on the Earth. This is only true if the branching ratios for different reaction channels do not depend on the presence of gravitation, etc.
The discussion of quantum non-locality and statements such as 'quantum correlations are necessarily between time-like events' [75] do not explain why strong correlations between space-like events in SPCE may and do exist.
In SPCE, a source is sending two signals to faraway detectors, clicks are produced and registered. After gathering several clicks, correlations between these clicks can be estimated and these estimations were output by online computers. The existence of correlated outcomes does not depend on whether some human agents perceived these clicks or not.
QBists forget that QM and QFT are much more than quantum information and that physicists are not interested in subjective experiences of various agents but they are trying to deduce the laws of Nature governing the external world.
A profound discussion of human efforts to understand and to model physical reality may be found in a stimulating book of Hermann Weyl [80] . 
The Bohr-Einstein quantum debate
In his viewpoint, Alain Aspect [70] resumes discussions and experiments performed to check Bell inequalities. He concludes that Einstein was wrong and that recent experiments [12] [13] [14] closed the door on Einstein and Bohr's quantum debate.
We disagree with this conclusion because, as we explained in preceding sections, the violation of Bell-type inequalities proves only that outcomes in SPCE are neither predetermined nor produced in an irreducibly random way. The hidden variable models LRHV and SHV suffer from a contextuality loophole because they do not incorporate correctly supplementary parameters describing measuring instruments [66, 67] . If such parameters are introduced, Belltype inequalities cannot be proved and correlations may be explained in a causally local way.
The Bohr-Einstein quantum debate is more fundamental.
Does QM provide a complete description of individual physical systems and of physical reality and in what sense?
The failure of the SHV model to explain SPCE seems to confirm Einstein's intuition that quantum probabilities are reducible and that QM may be emergent from some underlying theory giving more detailed locally causal description of phenomena.
According to Bohr, a satisfactory description of physical reality is given in terms of indivisible complementary quantum phenomena produced when identically prepared physical systems are analysed by various macroscopic experimental instruments. For Bohr, quantum probabilities are irreducible and a more detailed locally causal subquantum description of observed phenomena is impossible.
For Einstein, wave functions and density matrices describe only ensembles of identically prepared physical systems. The wave function reduction is not instantaneous and a reduced wave function provides a description of a new ensemble of physical systems. Einstein objected to Bohr's claim that probabilistic predictions of QT provided the most complete description of individual physical systems and believed that a more detailed description of atomic objects is possible [16, 17, 33, 36, 37] . In particular, he said to Pauli: 'like the moon has a definite position whether or not we look at the moon, the same must hold for the atomic objects, as there is no sharp distinction possible between these and macroscopic objects'.
Let us note that Einstein is talking about positions, when nobody observes them, and not about predetermined outcomes of position measurements. There is a fundamental difference between a position and a spin projection. Spin projection is a contextual property which is created in the interaction of electrons and photons with Stern-Gerlach instruments or with polarization beam splitters, respectively. A position does not need to be observed in order to be believed to exist.
For example, let us consider an electron. Many physicists, not listening to Bohr, imagine an electron as a point-like particle surrounded by the electromagnetic field it creates. A point-like particle by definition must have unknown but precise position in some reference frame.
We know the electron's rest mass and its electric charge no matter how we measure it. When passing through a bubble chamber the electron ionizes atoms, creating a macroscopic picture of the electron's trajectory. We can measure sharply neither its position nor its linear momentum. However, we can prepare in accelerators, using classical relativistic electrodynamics, beams of electrons, protons, heavy ions, etc., with little spread in their linear momentum and energy, and we may project these beams on different targets to study their collisions.
By contrast, a spin projection is not an electron's predetermined attribute. Experiments [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] confirm this particular character of spin projections but they have nothing to say about masses, charges, momenta, etc. Moreover, no intuitive mental picture of a single photon may be created.
It is also true that space-time localization loses its operational foundation in the micro-world and any attempt to strictly localize an elementary particle would lead probably to its destruction and/or to production of many other particles. This is why, to study interactions of elementary particles, one uses abstract state vectors described only by linear momenta, energy, spin and several internal quantum numbers. contributions to transition amplitudes. Nevertheless, physicists imagine electrons and quarks as point-like particles surrounded by a cloud of virtual photons, gluons, etc. The interactions between these elementary constituents of matter are described as exchanges of virtual photons and gluons. Moreover, the 'radius' of the proton, the ranges of various interactions and the lifetimes of many unstable particles and resonances are estimated. Thus, we see that in particle physics a space-time description of invisible events is not abandoned.
Human beings, in order to 'understand', have to create mental images and such images cannot be created without a notion of space-time. Einstein would probably agree with Bohr that Feynman graphs are not faithful images of what really is happening. Nevertheless, strangely enough, such mental images inspire physicists to improve their mathematical models, which leads to the discovery of new phenomena, new elementary particles and resonances.
If physicists listened to Bohr (with whom we agree on many points) and abandoned constructing mental images, the progress of science would be compromised. This is why recent experiments of Couder and co-workers [81] , with bouncing droplets (http://dualwalkers.com), may help perhaps to develop one day a more intuitive understanding of wave-particle duality and of quantum phenomena.
There is still no general agreement how to interpret QM and QFT and how to reconcile them with general relativity. In our opinion, a rigorous epistemological and ontological analysis of QFT is still lacking.
Incorrect interpretation of QT and/or incorrect mental images of quantum particles and measurements lead to paradoxes and to speculations which are pure science fiction.
Leslie Ballentine said in his book: 'Once acquired, the habit of considering an individual particle to have its own wave function is hard to beak. Even though it has been demonstrated strictly incorrect' [33] . Statistical contextual interpretation, inspired by Bohr and Einstein, seems to be the most cautious [29, 33, [35] [36] [37] 61] . Several arguments in favour of statistical interpretation of QT and how it may account for all properties of quantum measurements, including the uniqueness of individual outcomes, were given by Allahverdyan et al. [82, 83] .
According to the statistical interpretation, quantum states and operators are treated as mathematical abstract tools enabling quantitative predictions to be compared with the experimental data. Whether QM is emergent from some more detailed theory of quantum phenomena is an open question.
As the SHV model failed to explain the correlations observed in SPCE, quantum probabilities are not irreducible, as Bohr claimed; if they are not irreducible, they may emerge as in (2.1) from some more detailed subquantum description, which was suggested by Einstein. However, as Bohr insisted, quantum phenomena are contextual; therefore, any subquantum model of quantum measurement has to be contextual (include a description of measuring instruments).
Several attempts have been made to provide a more detailed description of various quantum phenomena [84-86].
We do not even know whether QT is predictably complete? In order to answer this question, a more detailed analysis of experimental data is needed [36, 37, [87] [88] [89] .
In view of all these arguments, contrary to Aspect's claim, the results of experiments [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] do not show that Einstein was wrong and Bohr was right. In our opinion, they show that Einstein's and Bohr's ideas may be in some sense reconciled and that the door on Einstein and Bohr's quantum debate cannot be closed.
Conclusion
The Bohr-Einstein quantum debate has been inspiring physicists for the last 80 years. Does quantum theory provide a complete description of individual physical systems? Is Nature local or not local? How can we reconcile apparent indeterminism of quantum phenomena with apparent locality and causality of the macroscopic world we are living in?
Efforts to answer these and other questions have not only allowed incredible technological progress but also computers, smart phones and the Internet have changed our social relations and culture. We are living now a second quantum revolution; this is why it is so important to find the explanation of quantum phenomena without evoking quantum magic. Magical explanations are usually counter-productive and misleading.
The violation of Bell-type inequalities demonstrated only that LRHV and SHV models failed to describe correlations observed in SPCE and that measured values of spin projections are neither predetermined nor produced in intrinsically random way.
LRHV and SHV models did not incorporate correctly supplementary parameters describing measuring instruments. If setting-dependent parameters are introduced, correlations observed in SPCE can be explained in a causally local way and Bell-type inequalities may not be proved. As we demonstrated in §6, contrary to a general belief, the introduction of such setting-dependent parameters is not in conflict with experimenters' freedom of choice.
In recent tests of local realism, a considerable effort was made to close the locality loophole and to create experimental conditions which made impossible causal influences between remote experimental devices. This constraint reduced significantly the size of post-selected samples.
As we demonstrated, such influences are not necessary for the existence of strong correlations between outcomes of distant random experiments; thus the correlations observed should not depend on how the settings are changed. It would be interesting to check, in the same experiment, whether closing or not closing the locality loophole leads to statistically significant differences between estimated correlations or not. We claim that it should not.
Then, instead of testing various Bell-type inequalities, one may concentrate on testing QM predictions for different angles by creating larger samples for each setting. One has to use synchronized time windows and select those in which both clicks were observed. One should estimate not only the correlations but also the probability distributions of single clicks. It would allow one to test homogeneity [29, 90, 91] of experimental samples, for each choice of settings, and to test whether some anomalies found earlier in Aspect's and Weihs' data would reappear [92] [93] [94] .
John Bell insisted that the question of completeness of QM cannot be answered using mathematical or philosophical reasoning but only by experiments. The experiments [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] eliminated LRHV and SHV models but were not able to give a definite answer. As Bell said in a different context: 'What is proved by impossibility proofs is lack of imagination'.
If QM is an emergent theory, as claimed by Einstein, then experimental time series may contain fine structures which are not predicted by QM and which might have been averaged out in a standard statistical analysis of experimental data. Thus to check whether QT is predictably complete, one has to study experimental time series in more detail than is usually done [87] [88] [89] .
The violation of various Bell-type inequalities does not allow one to conclude that 'Nature is non-local and that God plays dice'. Therefore, the Bohr-Einstein quantum debate may not be closed. The continuation of this debate is important not only for a better understanding of Nature but also for various practical applications of quantum phenomena.
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